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Abstract
The choice of a social decision rule for a federal assembly affects the
welfare distribution within the federation. But which decision rules can
be recommended on welfarist grounds? In this paper, we focus on two
welfarist desiderata, viz. (i) maximizing the expected utility of the whole
federation and (ii) equalizing the expected utilities of people from dif-
ferent states in the federation. We consider the European Union as an
example, set up a probabilistic model of decision making and explore
how different decision rules fare with regard to the desiderata. We start
with a default model, where the interests, and therefore the votes of the
different states are not correlated. This default model is then abandoned
in favor of models with correlations. We perform computer simulations
and find that decision rules with a low acceptance threshold do generally
better in terms of desideratum (i), whereas the rules presented in the
Accession Treaty and in the (still unratified) Constitution of the Euro-
pean Union tend to do better in terms of desideratum (ii). The ranking
obtained regarding desideratum (i) is fairly stable across different corre-
lation patterns.
1 Introduction
For a long time, social choice theory has been dominated by axiomatic ap-
proaches in the tradition of Arrow ([1]) and Sen ([9]). There works typically
start with a few axioms that put intuitively reasonable constraints on the social
welfare function, for instance. Unfortunately, it turns out that these constraints
cannot be fulfilled at the same time. Impossibility results of this kind are very
exciting. But they are of no help, if we are to decide between different social
decision rules.
Consider the European Union as an example. Many decisions are taken
by the European Council of Ministers (Council, for short). It works in the
following way: Each state of the European Union sends a representative to the
Council. The European Commission drafts a proposal, and the representatives
cast their votes on behalf of the states. The votes are aggregated, and a decision
is taken according to some decision rule. But which rule is most appropriate?
Impossibility results do not answer this question.
In this paper, we will take a different line of thought. We will start with
simple principles that spell out what makes a decision rule pro tanto better than
another one. We will then evaluate decision rules according to these principles.
As we will see, this requires us to set up a different framework (see [4]); and
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we will need to use new mathematical techniques and computational methods
such as computer simulations.
We choose a welfarist framework to evaluate alternative decision rules. It
is based on the following simple idea. The outcomes of a decision affect the
welfares of the people in the federation. A particular outcome may benefit some
people, it may harm other people, and it may make no difference to yet others.
Now different decision rules lead to different outcomes. As a consequence,
different decision rules result in different welfare distributions.
But which decision rule is best? To address this question, the welfare dis-
tribution that results from the adoption of a certain decision rule has to be
evaluated, and we propose to evaluate it according to the following two wel-
farist principles:
Utilitarianism Decision rule D1 is pro tanto better than decision rule D2, if
the expected utility is larger under D1 than under D2 (cp. [4]).
Egalitarianism Decision rule D1 is pro tanto better than decision rule D2, if
there is more equality in the distribution of the expected utilities across
the federation under D1 than under D2.1
We consider the European Union as an example. Over the last years, there
has been a lot of controversy about the question which decision rule to adopt for
the Council of Ministers (see, for example, [7]). Various decision rules have been
suggested and a large number of arguments has been put forward for each of
them. In previous work, we examined these proposals from a welfarist perspec-
tive [2] and assumed that the interests of the different states are uncorrelated.
But this is too strong an idealization, as similar states have similar interests
and therefore tend to cast the same votes. The new members of the EU are a
case in point. They have similar problems and have to meet similar challenges;
so a proposal that benefits, say, Poland will typically also benefit Slovenia; and
proposals that harm Poland, will also harm Slovenia. There might also be neg-
ative correlations. For instance, a proposal which is good for the large states
might be bad for the small states, and vice versa. This presence of correlations
in the interests of states (and their corresponding voting behavior) raises the
question if the decision rules that do best for uncorrelated interests will also do
best if interstate correlations are taken into account. This is the question we
will address in this paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces
our framework and lays out some of the relevant mathematics. The following
section 3 shows some of our results for vanishing correlations. Section 4 explains
how correlations can be modeled in our framework. We introduce four different
correlation patterns and run computer simulations. The results of these simu-
lations are presented and discussed in section 5. The papers ends, in section 6,
with some more general reflections.
1To make this principle more precise, an equality measure will be specified below.
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2 Welfarism and social decision rules
The basic idea of the welfarist approach to social decision making is that,
whether a proposal is accepted or rejected, makes a difference to the welfare
of the people in the federation. Here is an illustration. Let us assume that
it is proposed to construct a freeway in Portugal. If the proposal is rejected,
nothing changes. No one can profit from the freeway, and no one has to pay
for it. If the proposal is accepted, then the people of Portugal will, on average,
gain utility (as they get, for example, faster to work every day) while the people
in, say, Austria will, on average, loose utility as they have to contribute to its
costs without having a chance to use it that often.
Whether a proposal is accepted or not depends on the decision rule.
Weighted decision rules assign different weights to different states. Consider the
freeway example again and assume that a weighted rule is adopted. Clearly,
if the weights of Portugal are much larger than the weights of Austria, then
the freeway proposal might get accepted with the result that the Portugese can
sleep longer in the morning and the Austrians are left with the bill. If, on the
other hand, the weights of Austria are much larger than the weights of Portu-
gal, then the situation might be the other way round. In the end, the challenge
is to find a decision rule that leads to a good welfare distribution according to
our principles.
But there is a challenge ahead: We do not know the proposals beforehand.
To account for this uncertainty, we set up a probabilistic framework.
Let us now formalize these ideas. We consider a federation of m states with
a total number of N people. States are numbered from 1 to m and labeled
by lowercase letters (e.g. i, j). The ith state has Ni inhabitants. Of course,∑
iNi = N .
We model the proposals as exogeneous. A single proposal is represented by
a utility vector v = (v1, . . . , vm). Here vi is the average utility that people from
state i will receive, if the proposal is accepted.2 vi is positive, if there is an
average gain in utility for people from state i, and it is negative, if there is an
average loss in utility for people from state i. The status quo is normalized to 0
and a rejected proposal leads to a zero average utility transfer. Since we do not
know the proposals in advance, the utilities vi are values of random variables
Vi (i = 1, . . . ,m).
The vote of state i (or its representative) is described by another random
variable Λi with values λi. λi = −1 means that state i votes against the
proposal, and λi = +1 means state i votes for the proposal. (λ1, . . . , λm) is a
voting profile.
2Average utilities should not be confused with expected utilities which we will discus below.
Average utilities are means over people, expected utilities are means over different proposals
that follow a particular probability distribution. Note also that we start with a rather coarse-
grained description of decision making. A more fine-grained view would begin with the utilities
of the individual people in the federation. Accordingly, we will only consider inequality at a
coarse-grained level, i.e. on the level of states, and not of individual people.
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How do states vote, if a certain proposal v is on the table? We assume
that each state examines the average utility that the proposal will confer to
its own people. If the average utility is positive, it will vote in favour of the
proposal. If the average utility is negative, it will vote against the proposal. In
mathematical terms, the vote of state i is then given by λi = sign(vi).3
A decision rule can be represented as a function D from voting profiles
(λ1, . . . , λm) to {0, 1}. It takes the value 1, if the proposal is accepted, and the
value 0, if the proposal is rejected.
Suppose now, that a decision rule has been adopted and that a particular
proposal v is on the table. How will the decision affect the average utilities for
the different states? Call ui the average utility that people from state i will
receive from a decision on v. According to our assumptions, we have:
ui = vi ×D (λ1(v1), . . . , λm(vm)) . (1)
Since the vis are values of random variables, so are the uis. We denote the
corresponding random variables by Ui for i = 1, . . . ,m.
The expectation values of these random variables, E[Ui], are the key quan-
tities in our welfarist framework. Once we know them, we can calculate other
quantities that are required by our two principles. Utilitarianism requires the
average expected utility of a person in the EU which is given by
E[U ] =
1
N
∑
i
NiE[Ui] . (2)
Egalitarianism requires an equality measure. To keep things simple, we measure
the spread in the distribution of the E[Ui]s. Let us call this measure I. If I is
small, then the equality in the federation is high. If I is large, then the equality
is low. 4
Let us now calculate the expected utility E[Ui] for state i. To do so, we need
the joint probability distribution p(v) over the proposed utilities. According to
Eq. (1), we have
E[Ui] =
∫
dv p(v) viD (λ1(v1), . . . , λm(vm)) , (3)
where the integral over dv is m-dimensional. Note that the decision rule D is
a function of the voting profiles which are, in turn, a function of the vis.
For further analytical calculations, Eq. (3) can be rendered more manage-
able. To do so, we hold a voting profile (λ1, . . . , λm) fixed. The probability that
voting profile (λ1, . . . , λm) occurs is p(λ1, . . . , λm). It is given by
p(λ1, . . . , λm) =
∫
dv θ(λ1v1) . . . θ(λmvm) . (4)
3We need not consider the case of vi = 0 here, as it has zero measure under any reasonable
probability distribution.
4We assume here that each person in state i receives the average utility E[Ui] and calculate
the standard deviation of the expected utilities of single people. Note that this is nothing but
a first quick-and-dirty estimate of the inequality in the federation. There are other measures,
such as the Gini coefficient, that might be more appropriate.
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Similarly, we calculate the expected utility of state i if the voting profile is
(λ1, . . . , λm):
vλ1,...,λmi =
∫
dv viθ(λ1v1) . . . θ(λmvm)/p(λ1, . . . , λm) . (5)
With p(λ1, . . . , λm) and v
λ1,...,λm
i we can now calculate the expected utility
E[Ui] of state i:
E[Ui] =
∑
λ1,...,λm
vλ1,...,λmi × p(λ1, . . . , λm)D(λ1, . . . , λm) . (6)
To simplify things a bit more, we assume that the marginals for the different
states, i.e.
pi(vi) =
∫
dv1 · · ·
∫
dvi−1
∫
dvi+1 · · ·
∫
dvm p(v) , (7)
are identical. This means that, on the level of the proposals, there is no bias
towards one or the other state. We furthermore assume that the marginals are
normally distributed with a mean µ and a standard deviation σ. All utilities
are scaled such that σ = 1.5
3 Independent utilities from proposals
In order to explore the welfarist framework, we start with a simple default model
in which the Vis are independent. We will later relax this assumption. In the
default model, the joint probability distribution p(v) factorizes:
p(v) = pi(vi) · · · pm(vm) . (8)
This means that the utilities from proposals are uncorrelated for the various
states. If one knows that a proposal puts benefits on the Fins, one cannot infer
anything about the benefits or harms for people from other states. In order to
refer to Eq. (8) more quickly, we will somehow loosely say that the states are
independent. Note, however, that, even under Eq. (8), the random variables Ui
are not independent, but correlated. The reason is that the decision takes all
vis into account.
Under the assumption of Eq. (8), the sum in Eq. (6) can be worked out
analytically or directly calculatd by a computer program. For details, see [2].
To apply our methodology to the decision making in the European Union,
we consider five decision rules that were discussed in the context of the con-
stitutional reform of the EU.6 These decision rules can be organized into two
5If the utilities are independent in the same state, we would expect, according to the
central limit theorem, that the standard deviations for the different states are proportional
to 1/
√
Ni. However, [3] present a model with correlations within the same state that justifies
our choice of identical standard deviations.
6For a complementary approach in terms of expected utility see [4].
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groups. In the first group are three theoretical rules that assign a weight wi
proportional to Nαi with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 ([5]) to each state i (see [6], Chapter 2).
The weights are normalized to 1, i.e.
∑
i wi = 1 and a proposal is accepted
if the combined weights of the states which vote for the proposal exceeds a
threshold of .5. We consider the following theoretical rules.
(SME) Simple majority with equal weights (α = 0).
(P50) Simple majority with square root weights (α = .5).7
(SME) Simple majority with proportional weights (α = 1).
In the second group are two political rules, which are more complex than
the theoretical rules. Here each state is assigned several weights, which are
aggregated seperately. A proposal is accepted, if the aggregates exceed their
respective thresholds (for details see [2], Section 2).
(Acc) This rule, which is formulated in the Accession Treaty and which builds
on the Nice Treaty, is presently in force. It identifies three classes of
weights, one with α = 0 (threshold 50%), one with α = 1 (62%), and one
with an unsystematic weights (72%).
(Con) This rule is part of the Constitution that is presently in the process of
ratification. It identifies two classes of weights, one with α = 0 (threshold
58%) and one with α = 1 (65%).
Let us now briefly consider results for the default model (for details, see [2]).
In Figure 1 we show the expected utility of an average person in the EU (left
panel) and our measure of inequality (right panel). The larger the spread, the
more inequality we find in the federation. Our characteristics are shown as a
function of µ, the mean over the utilities from proposals.
Let us first consider expected utility. For µ significantly smaller than 0,
proposals are typically bad. They are therefore mostly rejected, and the utilities
of the people in the federation do not change. A closer inspection of the curves
shows that the political rules do slightly better for a range of negative µ-values.
For µ significantly larger than 0, the proposals are typically very good.
Therefore, most of them are accepted under any decision rule. As the utilities
are now conferred to the people, E[U ] will be positive. For µ > 1, the curves
for the different rules almost coincide.
The most interesting range is the one around µ = 0. This is also the most
realistic range of parameters, as we argue in sec. 5 of [2]. In this range the
decision rules yield significantly different results. The general trend is that the
theoretical rules do better. At µ = 0, SMP is the best rule, followed by P50
and SME.
Let us now turn to equality. As the right panel of Figure 1 shows, SMP
does very badly in terms of equality for µ ≈ 0. It is followed by P50 and the
political rules. SME exactly equalizes the expected utilities for any value of µ.
7This rule is named after Penrose, who invented it. See [8].
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Figure 1: The expected utility (left panel) and the measure of inequality (right
panel) as a function of µ for the alternative decision rules. Different point
styles designate different rules. Filled light blue squares: SMP; filled green
circles: P50 (square root weights); Filled dark blue triangles: SME. Red open
squares: Acc. Filled orange triangles: Constitution.
So far we have ranked a few decision rules. But there is still the question,
whether we have found the best rules on our desiderata. For the default model,
there are a few analytic results in this respect. [4] specify the best decision rule
in terms of expected utility – expected utility is maximized under proportional
weights and a threshold that depends on µ. An alternative proof for this result
is given by [3]. [3] also provide analytical arguments regarding the egalitarian
desideratum. They are based upon a relation to Banzhaf voting power (see [6]).
4 Modeling correlations
So far, our results assume that the utilities from proposals are uncorrelated for
the different states. But this assumption is not realistic, as we have argued
above. Thus the question arises whether the results we obtained for the default
model are stable if correlations are taken into account. To address this question,
we concentrate on the case of µ = 0.
To model correlations between the states, we assume that p(v) is a multi-
variate normal. It is fully determined by its covariance matrix. The entries in
this matrix are cij = E[ViVj ]−E[Vi]E[Vj ], where one has to take the expecta-
tion value over the probability distribution p in order to calculate E[·]. cii is
the variance for the utility from proposals for state i. We assume that it is set
to 1 for i = 1, . . . ,m as before.
As there is a lot of freedom to specify the entries cij and as we are inter-
ested in typical behavior that arises from correlations amongst the states, we
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CP type neg. cross corr. α = 0 α = .5 α = 1
1 small/large no .84/.16 .64/.36 .43/.57
2 South/North no .48/.52 .49/.51 .48/.52
3 small/large yes .84/.16 .64/.36 .43/.57
4 South/North yes .48/.52 .49/.51 .48/.52
Table 1: The parameters used in patterns CP1 to CP4. The numbers in the
α-columns are the aggregated weights of the states in each group.
define four correlation patterns (CP1 – CP4). Each correlation pattern has one
parameter (%) which measures the strength of the correlations. In the covari-
ance matrix, every off-diagonal entry is scaled by %. % = 0 means vanishing
correlations.
Each correlation pattern groups the states of the EU into two groups of
similar (population) size. Patterns CP1 and CP3 consider larger vs. smaller
states, and patterns CP2 and CP3 southern vs. northern states (see Table 1
for details).
CP1–2 States i, j from the same group are correlated with strength cij = %.
States i, j from different groups are uncorrelated ( cij = 0).
CP3–4 States i, j from the same group are correlated with strength cij = %.
States i, j from different groups are negatively correlated with cij = −%
(% > 0) reflecting the “zero-sum” character of (at least) some of the
decision making progresses in the EU: The gains of one states equal the
losses of another state.
While the case of zero correlations could be dealt with analytically, the case
of non-zero correlations requires the use of computer simulations. They are done
as follows. We evaluate the integral Eq. (3) in a Monte Carlo way. As many
Monte Carlo integrations, our simulations allow for a dynamical interpretation
in terms of an intuitive picture. The picture is as follows: We randomly draw
utilities vi according to our multivariate normal. We determine the votes of the
states and check whether the proposal is accepted or rejected. If it is accepted,
the respective utilities are distributed to the states, if not, nothing changes. We
repeat this Nsim = 106 times. In practice, the procedure converges quickly. In
order to get fast random numbers following a multivariate normal, we make a
coordinate transformation so that the correlation matrix becomes diagonal.
5 Results
Let us now turn to the outcomes of our simulations which are depicted in Figs. 2
to Fig. 5. The figures exhibit a rich structure and we will restrict ourselves to
a discussion of the main results.
8
Figure 2: Different characteristics as a function of % for CP1. Left top panel:
expected utility E[U ]. Right top panel: variance σw ({Ui}). Point styles in the
top panels as in Fig. 1. In the bottom panels we consider one rule and show
the expected utilities E[Ui] for every state i. Left bottom panel: SMP. Right
bottom panel: Constitution. The point styles are different here: Poland (red),
Spain (green), Italy (dark blue), U.K (cyan), France (magenta), Germany (light
blue), all other states (black).
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Figure 3: Results for CP2. Point styles in the top panels are as in Fig. 1; point
styles in the bottom panels are as in the bottom panels of Fig. 2.
We reserve one figure for each correlation pattern. We show the expected
utility E[U ] and the standard deviation of E[Ui]s as a function of the correlation
strength % for our rules (Fig. 2 contains two more panels, which we will consider
presently). The leftmost point (% = 0) corresponds to the point µ = 0 in Fig. 1.
Note that the ranking changes whenever two lines intersect.
The most important question is: Does the ranking of the various decision
rules that we obtained for the default model (Fig. 1) change if correlations
are taken into account? As Figs. 2 to 5 show, this ranking is fairly stable,
as far as the expected utility is concerned. Regarding inequality, there is one
significant change: SME, which minimizes inequality under the default model,
is worse than the political rules for all correlation patterns and a large range of
correlation strengths %. Apart from this, the political rules are better in terms
of equality than SMP and P50 both under the default model and if correlations
are turned on.
Let us now look at the expected utility of the whole federation, E[U ], in
more detail and explain some of its features. Whereas, under CP1 and CP2,
the expected utilities tend to increase with increasing correlation strength, they
decrease under CP3 and CP4. The reason is as follows: The most significant
contribution to E[U ] comes from proposals from which people from many states
benefit. Under CP1 and CP2, there are only positive correlations. The stronger
these correlations are, the more likely proposals will benefit people from many
states in the federation. Thus, E[U ] increases as a function of the correlation
strength. This holds quite independently of the respective decision rule. Note,
however, that, around % ≈ .9, things get more complicated, and particularly
SME is outrun by the political rules.
Under CP3 and CP4, on the contrary, there are more negative correlations
than positive correlations. So typically, if people from one group of states re-
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Figure 4: Results for CP3. Point styles as in Fig. 1.
ceive benefits, people from the other group have to pay. Accordingly, proposals
from which people from many states take profits, become less likely, and E[U ]
decreases, as % increases.
The curves for CP3 are very peculiar. SME and P50, which do reasonably
well under the default model, are outrun by the political rules for % & .2 and
% & .5, respectively. At % = 1, Acc and Con result in zero expected utility
for the federation, whereas SME and P50 produce a negative expected utility.
Here is an explanation for this behavior. Under CP3, the large states have the
majority of people. However, as Table 1 shows, under SME and P50, the small
states hold more weights than the threshold requires. At sufficiently large values
of %, the small states are very likely to vote in the same way. Thus, if a proposal
is accepted, it will very likely benefit most of the small states. However, because
of the anticorrelations in CP3, such a proposal tends to be harmful to people
from the larger states. And since there are more people from larger states than
from smaller states, E[U ] will drop below zero.
The political rules, on the other hand, have higher thresholds of acceptance.
A proposal is only accepted, if both large and small states vote for it. As %
increases, under CP3, proposals will less likely put benefits on both people from
large and from small states. Accordingly, large and small states are less likely
to cast the same vote “yes”. As a result, proposals are less likely to be accepted,
and E[U ] approaches 0.
The lesson is, clearly, as follows: If there are two groups that have anticor-
related interests, it is very bad in terms of expected utility to give the smaller
group more weights than the threshold requires.
Let’s now look at our measure of inequality I in more detail (right panels).
Overally, the curves look very similar: As % increases, the measure of inequality
for the theoretical rules increases. At % = 1, a maximum value of I is reached.
The political rules change a bit in terms of I and approach I = 0 at % = 1.
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Figure 5: Results for CP4. Point styles as in Fig. 2.
The explanation can be obtained from the bottom panels of Fig. 2, where
the E[Ui]s are shown as functions of %. We observe that two groups are formed
in the following sense: As % increases, the E[Ui]-values of states from the same
group get closer. However, whereas, under Con, the expected utilities for the
groups converge in the limit of % = 1, they diverge under SMP. This produces
a finite variance. The explanation should come as no surprise, given what we
have said before. Under the political rules, states from both groups are needed
for acceptance. As a consequence, it will not make a big difference in terms of
E[Ui], to which group a state belongs. At % = 1, the only proposals that have
non-zero probability and that yield acceptance, put the same utility to people
from every state. So there is zero variance. Under the theoretical rules, on the
other hand, the states from one group will hold more weights than the threshold
requires. Accordingly, it makes a big difference to E[Ui], whether state i is a
member of this group or not, and the variance approaches a finite value.
Note, that the ranking of the theoretical rules is different for the different
correlation patterns, as far as I is concerned. For CP1 and CP3, SME is worst
for a large range of %-values, whereas SMP does worst for almost all value of %.
We also obtained results for finite µ-values. Overally, our results do not
change much, as we move to finite µ-values of the order of .2 (other values of µ
are not realistic).
Again there is the question, whether we have found the best decision rules
on our desiderata. From the proof of Theorem 1 in [4] one can construct the
rule that maximizes expected utility, even if there are non-zero correlations.
Unfortunately, this decision rule is very complicated in general and not suitable
for practical purposes. So we think it more appropriate to start with some
subset of simple decision rules and to look for the best of them, as we did. But
for this it is certainly useful to scan the range of α-values more systematically.
We leave that for future work. Regarding equality, we are not aware of analytic
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arguments on the best decision rule.
6 Conclusions
The welfarist framework presented in this paper complements the axiomatic
approach that has been dominating social choice theory for the last fifty years.
We start from sensible desiderata that specify when one rule is better than
another one and rank alternative decision rules with respect to these desiderata.
Our approach allows us to naturally include “empirical” constraints (such as
correlations in the interests of states). Our work profits from the rapid progress
in computer science; this helps us to simulate proposals and votes that follow
complicated probability distributions. The computational methods we adopt
have been used in other disciplines, and we hope to have convinced the reader
that they have much to offer to social choice theory as well.
In this paper, we found two main results. First, regarding expected utility,
we obtain a fairly stable ranking of the decision rules, where SMP does best
and the political rules do worst. This is suggested by our simulations of four
different correlation patterns with varying correlation strength. We take the
stability of the ranking to be good news for the welfarist framework – if the
the ranking of the rules ware too sensitive to the correlation pattern and the
correlation strength, our account would be useless for policy recommendations.
Second, the two welfarist principles that we studied in this paper, utilitarianism
and egalitarianism, pull in different directions. Whereas political rules with high
acceptance thresholds tend to do better in maximizing the expected utility of
the federation, theoretical rules are superior in achieving equality. As both
principles cannot be satisfied at the same time (at least by the rules studied
in this paper), one has to strike a compromise. For vanishing correlations,
the rule SME seems to be a reasonable candidate: It yields no inequality at
all and is at least better than the political rules in terms of expected utility.
Unfortunately, this result does not hold anymore for finite correlations, where
SME may produce inequalities that are much larger than the inequalities under
political rules.
Another way to compromise between utilitarianism and egalitarianism is to
introduce relative weights for these principles. We leave this for future research.
We also plan to find realistic correlation models that adequately reflect the
correlations of votes found in empirical data.
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